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complex for users to understand, and that website policy 
statements do not match consumers’ privacy expectations. 
Efforts to ameliorate these issues through technological 
tools, such as privacy filters and do-not-track codes, have 
been unsuccessful.  Further, these tools do not address 
whether notice and choice theory aligns with the actual 
privacy harms that consumers experience.   
 
This alignment remains unexplored. This article proposes to 
examine the relationship between the notice and choice 
theory and users’ actual privacy concerns. The article takes a 
novel approach that examines federal privacy litigation and 
FTC enforcement actions. This focus on the wrongs litigated 
in the real world reveals the most important harms that 
consumers experience and provides a better understanding 
of the efficacy of the notice and choice framework. 
 
The data set compiled to support the research for the article 
consists of all federal class action complaints alleging online 
privacy violations filed during the last ten years and the 
Federal Trade Commission complaints and settlements 
addressing online privacy.  The article next addresses the 
roles that jurisdiction and competence play in framing 
claims, and identifies a typology of the wrongful acts 
experienced by consumers.  The research shows that four 
types of claims appear in both private litigation and public 
enforcement with respect to personal information:  (1) 
unauthorized disclosure, (2) surreptitious collection, (3) 
failure to secure, and (4) undue retention.  
 
The article then applies this typology to map “zones of 
effectiveness” for the notice and choice regime.  The article 
identifies which wrongs a proper notice and choice regime 
can and cannot address.   The research demonstrates that 
while some wrongful practices might be avoided by the 
inclusion of specific statements in a notice, others will be 
incurable through notice.  The latter set of wrongs is outside 
the “zone of effectiveness” of a notice and choice regime.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States has historically considered two models for the 
protection of information privacy:  targeted statutory rights such as 
the Fair Credit Reporting Act and market self-regulation based on 
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notice and choice.1  In the last fifteen years, the Federal Trade 
Commission and the White House have promoted notice and choice as 
the preferred mechanism for protecting consumers’ privacy online.2  
But law and policy scholars have doubted the practical efficacy of this 
mechanism.3 
Technologists, however, have tried to address the efficacy and 
have sought to develop various tools that would facilitate use of notice 
and choice for online users.4  At best, these tools have only achieved 
modest success.5 More recently, serious efforts to develop automated 
machine learning tools, also known as natural language processing, 
have emerged to offer promise of greater effectiveness.6 These tools 
 
 
 
 
1  See e.g., DANIEL SOLOVE AND PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS (2013); 
Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in 
Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1315 (2000). 
 
2  See e.g., Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, THE WHITE HOUSE (2012) 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/02/23/we-can-t-wait-obama-
administration-unveils-blueprint-privacy-bill-rights; FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING 
CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE:  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESS AND 
POLICY MAKERS (2012) http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-
trade-commission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-
recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf.  
 
3  See generally Fred Cate, Protecting Privacy in Health Research: The Limits of 
Individual Choice, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1765 (2011).  See also infra Part II.A.2 and 
accompanying notes.  
 
4  Tools such as the Platform for Privacy Preferences (“P3P”), privacy seals, and browser 
plug-ins have not succeeded in achieving wide adoption.    
 
5  Research shows that users rarely read website privacy policies, that such policies are 
often too complex for users to understand, and that website policy statements do not 
match consumers’ privacy expectations.   See infra Part II.A.2 and accompanying notes.  
Efforts to ameliorate theses issues through technological tools, such as privacy filters and 
do-not-track codes, have been unsuccessful.  See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, et al., 
Disagreeable Privacy Policies: Mismatches Between Meaning and Users’ Understanding, 
30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (describing research on privacy policy 
usability and technical tools for usability improvement).  
 
6  For example, research for this paper was funded through a $3.4 million National Science 
Foundation collaborative grant to Carnegie Mellon University, Fordham University, and 
Stanford University to explore natural language tools and crowd sourcing as means to help 
users understand web privacy policies.  See Norman Sadeh et al., Towards Usable Privacy 
Policies: Semi-automatically Extracting Data Practices From Websites' Privacy Policies 
(Poster), ACM SYMP. ON USABLE SECURITY AND PRIVACY (SOUPS 2014); N. Sadeh et al., The 
Usable Privacy Policy Project: Combining Crowdsourcing, Machine Learning and 
Natural Language Processing to Semi-Automatically Answer Those Privacy Questions 
Users Care About, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY, SCHOOL OF COMPUTER SCI., INST.  
SOFTWARE RES. TECHNICAL REP., CMU-ISR-13-119 (2013); Steve Bellovin and Sebastian 
Zimmeck, Machine Learning Analysis of Privacy Policies, U. MICH. TELECOMM. L. REV. 
(forthcoming); Sebastian Zimmeck and Steven M. Bellovin, Privee: An Architecture for 
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would seek to use automated, computer processing to decipher the 
meaning of website privacy policies and then present users with 
meaningful indications of a site’s information practices. The success of 
these technologies will depend on the clarity of website privacy 
policies and whether the policies actually address the harms that users 
experience. Even the most promising natural language processing 
tools to improve the function of notice and choice do not address 
whether notice and choice theory aligns with the actual privacy harms 
that consumers experience.   
This Article proposes to examine the relationship between the 
notice and choice theory and users’ actual privacy concerns.  The 
Article takes a novel empirical approach that examines both federal 
privacy litigation and FTC enforcement actions.7 This focus on the 
wrongs litigated in the real world reveals the most important privacy 
harms that consumers experience and provides a better 
understanding of the areas where the notice and choice framework 
may or may not be effective.8  
The Article begins with a discussion of the background on notice 
and choice and users’ protections (Part II). Next, the Article explains 
the method for collecting data about privacy events and harms, and 
examines the roles that jurisdiction and competence play in framing 
claims (Part III). The following part extrapolates from that data the 
typology of harms or wrongful acts that users perceive (Part IV).  The 
analysis of the data reveals that four types of claims appear in both 
private litigation and public enforcement with respect to personal 
information: (1) unauthorized disclosure, (2) surreptitious collection, 
(3) failure to secure, and (4) undue retention. Based on this typology, 
Part V maps the “zones” where notice and choice may be effective and 
where it will be ineffective as a framework to protect user privacy. In 
essence, this part identifies those wrongs that a notice and choice 
framework can and cannot address. The research demonstrates that 
                                                                                                                   
Automatically Analyzing Web Privacy Policies, PROC. OF 23RD USENIX SECURITY SYMP., 
AUGUST 2014, USENIX ASS’N, https://www.usenix.org/conference/ usenixsecurity14/ 
technicalsessions/presentation/zimmeck.  
 
7  Other studies have addressed issues either with respect to the FTC or with respect to 
specific litigation, but none have provided a full picture.  See, e.g., Sasha Romanosky, 
David A. Hoffman, & Alessandro Acquisti, Empirical Analysis of Data Breach Litigation, 
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD., (forthcoming), available at  http://ssrn.com/ abstract=1986461 
(analyzing breach litigation); Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The FTC and the New 
Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014) (discussing FTC cases). 
 
8 This approach focuses on practices that become known to consumers.  If consumers are 
unaware of data practices, then consumers would not perceive a harm and there would be 
no litigation even though privacy invasions might be taking place.   
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while some wrongful practices might be avoided by the inclusion of 
specific statements in a notice, others will be incurable through notice.  
The latter set of wrongs is, thus, outside the “zone of effectiveness” of 
a notice and choice regime.  The Article concludes with a discussion of 
the policy implications of the findings. 
II. THE BACKGROUND FOR NOTICE AND CHOICE AND USER 
PROTECTIONS 
This Part provides background on issues surrounding the efficacy 
of notice and choice and then sets out the goal for our empirical 
research—exploring user concerns through litigation events to better 
understand the mechanism’s effectiveness as a privacy protection. 
A. The Efficacy of the Notice and Choice Regime 
The FTC has identified notice as “[t]he most fundamental 
principle” in online privacy.9  While some commentators and 
policymakers commend notice and choice, the mechanism has also 
been widely criticized.  
1. Commendations of Notice and Choice  
The notice and choice mechanism is designed to put individuals in 
charge of the collection and use of their personal information.  In 
theory, the regime preserves user autonomy by putting the individual 
in charge of decisions about the collection and use of personal 
information.10 Notice and choice is asserted as a substitute for 
regulation because it is thought to be more flexible, inexpensive to 
implement, and easy to enforce.11 Additionally, notice and choice can 
legitimize an information practice, whatever it may be, by obtaining 
 
 
 
 
9  FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 7 (June 1998), available 
at www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/priv-23a.pdf. 
 
10  See M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1027, 1049 (2012) (citing Paula J. Dalley, The Use and Misuse of Disclosure 
as a Regulatory System, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1089, 1093 (2007) (“[D]isclosure schemes 
comport with the prevailing political philosophy in that disclosure preserves individual 
choice while avoiding direct governmental interference.”).  
 
11  See Calo, supra note 1o, at 1048; see also Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The 
Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 682 (noting that notice “looks 
cheap” and “looks easy”).  
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an individual’s consent.12 Individual privacy preferences vary, and 
people who place a low value on privacy should be able to exchange it 
for goods, services, or information that they value more highly.13  The 
mechanism prevents the setting of an arbitrary floor or ceiling for 
privacy.14    
Partly as a result, notice and choice avoids the overregulation of 
legitimate business interests.15 “[R]igid restrictions” resulting from 
overregulation can stifle innovation and competition, but the 
mechanism’s emphasis on user autonomy prevents this.16  In other 
words, notice and choice is seen as an alternative to statutory and 
administrative regulation. 
2. Criticisms of Notice and Choice  
Despite its claimed advantages, the notice and choice system faces 
many criticisms. Most of these criticisms focus on the mechanism’s 
tendency to mis- or under-inform, its impracticality (in terms of 
costliness and scope), the extent to which users’ cognitive hurdles 
limit its effectiveness, and the effect of creating undesirable 
externalities. 
 
 
 
 
12  Mark MacCarthy, New Directions in Privacy: Disclosure, Unfairness and Externalities, 
6 ISJLP 425, 440 (2011) (citing M. Ryan Calo, A Hybrid Conception of Privacy Harm 
(Draft) PRIVACY LAW SCHOLARS CONF., 28 (2010). 
 
13  See Calo, supra note 10 (citing James P. Nehf, Shopping for Privacy Online: Consumer 
Decision Making Strategies and the Emerging Market for Information Privacy, 2005 U. 
ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 14–17 (2007)).  
 
14  See Calo, supra note 10; see also infra note 15. 
 
15  See Calo, supra note 10, at 1049-50; see also Kenneth A. Bamberg & Deirdre K. 
Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 303 (2011) (“The 
shortcomings of command-and-control governance…are well recognized.”); Dennis D. 
Hirsch, Protecting the Inner Environment: What Privacy Regulation Can Learn From 
Environmental Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1, 9–11, 33–37 (2006) (arguing that “command-and-
control type regulations would not be a good fit for the highly diverse and dynamic digital 
economy” due to the expense and threat to innovation.”). 
 
16  See Calo, supra note 10, Calo argues that notice may be “more palatable to regulated 
industry.”  Id.  As he puts it: “Mandated notice can and does face opposition, but 
opposition tends to be less fierce than do top-down dictates regarding what a company can 
and cannot do.  Regulators, eager to do something to help consumers, but lacking the 
political capital or will to limit or curtail the activities of a given industry, may opt for 
notice as a means at least to improve the context of online privacy for some consumers.”  
Id.  
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a. Inadequate Information 
 
The notice and choice mechanism is often criticized for leaving 
users uninformed—or misinformed, as people rarely see, read, or 
understand privacy policies.17  Critics argue that users who do not read 
privacy policies become uninformed consumers who can neither 
“protect[ ] themselves [n]or polic[e] the market.”18 And even if people 
do read the policies, they are unlikely to understand them, as policies 
are often long and filled with legal jargon.19 Thus, policy readers often 
make “woefully incorrect assumptions” about how websites protect 
their privacy.20 
 
 
 
 
17  Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 1879, 1885 (2013) (citing Jon Leibowitz, Fed. Trade Comm’n, So Private, 
So Public: Individuals, the Internet & the Paradox of Behavioral Marketing, Remarks at the 
FTC Town Hall Meeting on Behavioral Advertising: Tracking, Targeting, & Technology 
(Nov. 1, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/ speeches/ leibowitz/ 
071031ehavior/ pdf).  Paul Ohm refers to these issues as “information-quality problems.”  
See Paul Ohm, Branding Privacy, 97 MINN. L. REV. 907, 930 (2013).  Daniel J. Solove 
refers to this as “the problem of the uninformed individual.”  See Solove, supra note 17. 
 
18  See Calo, supra note 10; see also Sarah Gordon, Symantec Security Response, Privacy at 
12 (2003), available at http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/privacy. attitudes 
.behaviors.pdf (noting that only three people out of a sixty-three-member study reported 
reading a privacy policy); Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated 
Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 671 (2011) (noting that readership of boilerplate 
language “is effectively zero”).  Additionally, a 2002 Yahoo report suggested that fewer 
than 1% of the website’s visitors read its privacy policy.  See MacCarthy, supra note 12, at 
436; see also Fred H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in 
CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE INFORMATION ECONOMY 361 (Jane K. Winn ed., 
2006)). 
 
19  See Bianca Bosker, Facebook Privacy Policy Explained: It’s Longer than the 
Constitution, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 8, 2014 12:47 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com 
/ 2010/05/12/facebook-privacy-policys_n_ 574389.html; see also Guilbert Gates, 
Facebook Privacy: A Bewildering Tangle of Options, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2014 12:50 PM), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/ 2010/05/12/ business/facebook-privacy.html?ref= 
personaltech (providing an infographic representing the webpages and subpages of 
Facebook and the privacy settings associated with each, as well as the word counts of other 
popular websites’ privacy policies, as of May 21, 2010).  
 
20  See Solove, supra note 17, at 1886.  Solove cites two studies revealing gross 
misinformation on the part of users. In one, people correctly answered questions about the 
privacy of their online transactions only 30% of the time.  See Joseph Turow et al., 
Contrary to What Marketers Say, Americans Reject Tailored Advertising and Three 
Activities that Enable It, 20-21 (Sept. 29, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (available at 
http://ssrn.com/paper=1478214.). In another, “64% [of the people surveyed] do not know 
that a supermarket is allowed to sell other companies information about what they buy.”  
See JOSEPH TUROW, LAUREN FELDMAN & KIMBERLY MELTZER, OPEN TO EXPLOITATION: 
AMERICAN SHOPPERS ONLINE AND OFFLINE (Univ. of Pa., Annenberg Pub. Policy Ctr. 2005), 
available at http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/  downloads/information_and_ 
society/turow_appc_report_web_final.pdf.  That same study revealed that 75% of study 
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b.  Impracticality 
The notice and choice mechanism is impractical.  To start, there 
are simply too many privacy policies to keep track of, given the 
potentially hundreds of websites a user might visit on any given day.21  
To read all of these privacy policies would be extremely time 
consuming22 and extremely costly.23 
To complicate matters, users’ multiple online interactions make it 
nearly impossible for users to control the online flow of data about 
them.  Typically, websites contract with third parties who collect, 
track, or analyze visitor data.  Such an arrangement makes it difficult 
for visitors to know or control what happens to their data.24  
Additionally, websites’ privacy policies do not govern other connected 
third party websites, so first party websites cannot inform users as to 
                                                                                                                   
respondents incorrectly believed that the existence of a privacy policy meant that the 
website would not disclose user information with other entities.  See id.  
 
21  See Ohm, supra note 17; Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 18 (describing the 
“overload effect” in online disclosure).  Daniel Solove refers to this as “the problem of 
scale.”  See Solove, supra note 17,at 1888-89.  He puts it this way: 
“The problem is reminiscent of the beleaguered student whose 
professors collectively assign too much reading each night.  From the 
perspective of each professor, the reading is a reasonable amount for an 
evening.  But when five or six simultaneously assign a night’s worth of 
reading, the amount collectively becomes too much.  Thus, even if all 
companies provided notice and adequate choices, this data 
management problem would persist; the average person just does not 
have enough time or resources to manage all the entities that hold her 
data.”   
Solove, supra note 17, at 1889.  
 
22  Lorrie Cranor estimates that it would take a user an average of 244 hours per year to 
read the privacy policy of every website she visited.  See Lorrie Faith Cranor, Necessary But 
Not Sufficient: Standardized Mechanisms for Privacy Notice and Choice, 10 J. TELECOMM. 
& HIGH TECH. L. 273, 274 (2012).  This translates to about 54 billion hours per year for 
every U.S. consumer to read all the privacy policies he or she encountered.  See Aleecia M. 
McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 ISJLP 543, 563 
(2008).  
 
23  A Carnegie Mellon study estimated that it would cost $781 billion if every U.S. worker 
read each privacy policy he or she encountered.  See McDonald and Cranor, supra note 22 
at 564–65. 
 
24  See Cranor, supra note 22; see also MacCarthy, supra note 12, at 436–37 (“Privacy 
policies for the first-party websites that users interact with are difficult enough for users to 
understand, but when third-party sites enter the mix, the notion of effective privacy notice 
becomes completely untenable.”);  Solove, supra note 17 (referring to “the problem of 
scale”).  
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how third parties use the data they collect from visitors.25  The notice 
and choice framework does not obtain user consent for such 
secondary information use.26  Accordingly, this “potentially unending 
chain of actors” means that “there is a degree to which the tracking, 
analysis, and use (current and future) of data is not only difficult to 
grasp, but unknowable.”27 
Related to the problem of data control is the problem of 
aggregation.28  Though people might make reasonable decisions about 
revealing pieces of information based on the contents of one privacy 
policy, they may not realize that, in the future, these bits could be 
aggregated into a bigger picture that reveals sensitive information.29  
Because users have difficulty understanding the effects of future 
aggregation, they have difficulty assessing future harm and are thus 
 
 
 
 
25  See Solon Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum, On Notice: The Trouble with Notice and 
Consent, PROC. OF THE ENGAGING DATA FORUM: THE FIRST INT’L FORUM ON THE 
APPLICATION AND MGMT. OF PERSONAL ELECTRONIC INFO. (Oct. 2009), available at 
http://www.nyu.edu/projects/nissenbaum/main_cv.html#pub.  The authors note that, for 
example, as of July 27, 2009, NYTimes.com lists 14 common user-tracking advertising 
services not governed by the website’s privacy policy.  See id. at 5.  The result of this 
structure is that users cannot “fathom” five points that are crucial for making an informed 
choice: “(1) Which actors have access […]; (2) What information they have access to […]; 
(3) What they do or may do with [the] information; (4) Whether the information remains 
with the publisher or is directly or indirectly conveyed to third parties; and (5) What 
privacy policies apply to the publisher compared to [ ] all the third parties, assuming these 
are even known to the users.”  Id.  
 
26  MacCarthy, supra note 12, at 436 (citing Fred H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information 
Practice Principles, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE INFORMATION ECONOMY. 
361 (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006)). 
 
27  See Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 25. 
 
28  See Solove, supra note 17, at 1889–90 (2013).  Solove explains: 
“Suppose a person gives out an innocuous piece of data at one point in 
time, thinking that he or she is not revealing anything sensitive.  At 
other points in time, the person reveals equally nonsensitive data.  
Unexpectedly, this data might be combined and analyzed to reveal 
sensitive facts about the person.  The person never disclosed these facts 
nor anticipated that they would be uncovered.  The problem was that 
the person gave away too many clues.  Modern data analytics…can 
deduce extensive information about a person from these clues.  In other 
words, little bits of innocuous data can say a lot in combination.”  
Id.  
29  See Solove, supra note 17, at 1889–90. 
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unable to engage in an analysis of the long-term costs and benefits 
associated with divulging information.30 
Another criticism is that website privacy policies often give 
websites the right to change their policies and relationships with third 
parties at any time.31  Here, the implication is that users will be 
expected to constantly re-check a website’s privacy policy (and the 
policies of affiliated third parties, too) to keep abreast of a site’s 
current privacy practices.32  In reality, to do this would prove 
immensely burdensome in terms of time and money.33  Such 
malleability for websites reveals how “flimsy” privacy commitments 
can be,34  “even if [a user] were to vigilantly follow the privacy policies 
of the relevant actors, [she] may find that prior commitments no 
longer apply retroactively.”35 
c. Cognitive Hurdles 
One scholar claims that the notice and choice mechanism is 
ineffective because humans suffer from “bounded rationality and 
cognitive biases.”36  This is illustrated by another study that reported 
survey participants erroneously believed that the mere existence of a 
website privacy policy meant the company promised not to share 
personal information.37  Other studies suggest that the way a company 
 
 
 
 
30  Solove, supra note 17, at 1891.  Solove explains that this occurs because privacy harms 
are “cumulative in nature,” and that “harmful effects may only emerge from the 
downstream uses of the combination of data.”  Id. 
 
31  See Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 25. 
 
32  See Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 25; see also Solove, supra note 17, at 1888–89 
(“And many entities frequently modify their privacy policies, so reading them all just once 
is not enough.”).  
 
33  See supra notes 21 and 22 (discussing the amount of time and cost in dollars it would 
take for website visitors to read privacy policies).  
 
34  See Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 25.   
 
35  See Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 25. 
   
36  See Ohm, supra note 17, at 931. 
 
37  See Ohm, supra note 17, at 931; see also Joseph Turow, et al., The Federal Trade 
Commission and Consumer Privacy in the Coming Decade, 3 ISJLP 723, 730–32 (2008). 
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expresses privacy terms (often in vague or uncertain language) has an 
effect on whether users accept those terms.38 
d. Negative Externalities 
The notice and choice mechanism is also criticized for creating 
“negative privacy externalities.”39 For example, one person’s 
disclosure of information may reveal information about other parties, 
possibly to their detriment.40  In this regard, notice and choice’s focus 
on individual consent dooms the mechanism to “fail[ ] to account for 
the social impacts of individual privacy decisions.”41 
 
 
 
 
38  See Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, What Can Behavioral Economics Teach Us 
About Privacy?, in DIGITAL PRIVACY: THEORY, TECHNOLOGIES, AND PRACTICES § 18.3.2, at 
370 (Alessandro Acquisti et al. eds., 2008). For example, consumers trust the privacy 
policies of aesthetically pleasing websites.  See id. at 371.  Additionally, prospect theory, the 
endowment effect, and hyperbolic discounting help explain people’s failures when 
assessing privacy risks.  See id. at §§ 18.3.2, 18.3.3, at 371–72.  Prospect theory is the 
framework that “provides an interpretation of how individuals evaluate and compare 
uncertain gains and losses.”  Id. at 371.  The endowment effect is the phenomenon whereby 
individuals value a good in their possession more highly than they would value the same 
good if it were not in their possession.  See id. at 372.  Hyperbolic discounting is the “idea 
that people do not discount distant and close events in a consistent way.” Id. 
 
39  See MacCarthy, supra note 12, at 428–29. 
 
40  See MacCarthy, supra note 12, at 428–29. MacCarthy provides a few illustrative 
examples.  For instance, an analysis of a person’s social network friends may reveal details 
about his or her sexual orientation.  See id. at 429 (citing Matthew Moore, Gay Men ‘Can 
Be Identified by Their Facebook Friends’, THE TELEGRAPH (Sept. 21, 2009), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/facebook/6213590/Gay-men-can-be-identified-
by-their-Facebook-friends.html).  Negative privacy externalities also arise in the context of 
“eligibility decisions, where those with a favored characteristic have an incentive to 
disclose, thereby outing those who remain silent.”  Id.  For example, people who do not 
smoke will reveal so much to their health insurance companies, who then might be able to 
identify smokers based on their lack of such a disclosure.  Id. 
 
41  See Solove, supra note 17, at 1892 (“Individual privacy has a variety of social 
functions.”).  See also Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act, Information Privacy, and the Limits of Default Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1221 
(2002) (“[I]nformation privacy should be conceptualized as a norm constitutive of a 
democratic society.”); Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 
HASTINGS L.J. 877, 882–83 (2003) (“Society as a whole has an important stake in the 
contours of the protection of personal information.”); Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in 
an Information Society, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 707, 709 (1987) (“[P]rivacy considerations no 
longer arise out of particular individual problems; rather, they express conflicts affecting 
everyone.”); Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in 
the Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 959 (arguing that the tort of invasion of 
privacy “does not simply uphold the interests of individuals against the demands of 
community, but instead safeguards rules of civility that in some significant measure 
constitute both individuals and community.”); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy 
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e.  FTC Response to Notice and Choice Issues  
The intent of a notice and choice regime is to enable users to make 
meaningful, informed decisions regarding their privacy. For a user to 
have control over his or her privacy, he or she must be able to both 
understand the consequences and control the disclosure of his or her 
personal information.42  The reality, however, is that “individuals 
often lack complete information about the consequences of 
information disclosure as well as mechanisms for ensuring that their 
information is disclosed only in the ways they desire.”43 
Accordingly, in 2010, the FTC staff noted that the “notice-and-
choice model, as implemented, has led to long, incomprehensible 
privacy policies that consumers typically do not read, let alone 
understand,” and recommended that “[p]rivacy notices should be 
clearer, shorter, and more standardized, to enable better 
comprehension and comparison of privacy practices.”44 
B. Litigated Privacy Harms and Notice and Choice  
Aside from the theoretical perspective on notice and choice, 
individuals and the FTC perceive online privacy harms that warrant 
redress. When individuals experience significant wrongs, they will 
seek redress for those privacy harms through litigation. Similarly, 
when the FTC perceives commercial practices that cause significant 
harm to consumers, the agency will bring enforcement actions.   These 
litigation events serve as a valuable proxy for the privacy harms that 
matter most to the public.  By looking at both types of litigation events 
together, a general set of critical harms can be identified, though other 
harms may also exist and not be litigated because the practices are 
hidden.45 These litigated harms can offer a window on the theory 
                                                                                                                   
in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1613 (1999) (“The Internet's potential to improve 
shared life in the United States will be squandered unless we structure the kinds of 
information use necessary for democratic community and individual self-governance.”).  
 
42  See Cranor, supra note 22, at 278 (citing LORRIE FAITH CRANOR, PRIVACY POLICIES AND 
PRIVACY PREFERENCES, in SECURITY AND USABILITY: DESIGNING SECURE SYSTEMS THAT 
PEOPLE CAN USE 448 (Lorrie Faith Cranor & Simson Garfinkel, eds., 2005). 
 
43  See Id. at 278-79.  
 
44  Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Staff Issues Privacy Report, Offers Framework 
for Consumers, Businesses, and Policymakers (Dec. 1, 2010).  
 
45  Other studies have addressed issues either with respect to the FTC or with respect to 
specific litigation, but none have provided a full picture.  See, e.g., Sasha Romanosky, 
David A. Hoffman, & Alessandro Acquisti, Empirical Analysis of Data Breach Litigation, 
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about the effectiveness of the notice and choice framework.  In other 
words, the privacy harms must be able to align with the privacy 
protections of notice and choice.  
III. PRIVACY EVENTS AND HARMS 
With the goal in mind of identifying the alignment between 
privacy harms, and “notice and choice,” the data set compiled to 
support the research for this Article consisted of (i) all federal class 
action complaints alleging online privacy violations filed during the 
period from the first FTC online privacy complaint (February 12, 
1999) to November 11, 2013 and (ii) all Federal Trade Commission 
complaints and settlements addressing online privacy over the same 
period. This universe of litigation was analyzed to identify particular 
types of privacy harms in search of redress through legal 
proceedings.46  For reasons described below, separate methodologies 
were used to identify the online privacy federal class actions and FTC 
actions. 
A. Litigation 
To determine which online privacy issues are important to 
consumers, federal class action lawsuits that alleged violations of 
consumers’ privacy rights were analyzed. The rationale is that these 
lawsuits serve as a proxy for the harms that were most significant to 
consumers when they became aware of specific data practices. 
1. Search Parameters 
To find class action lawsuits, keyword searches were conducted in 
the Pleadings Index available on the Westlaw Next electronic legal 
database.47  To determine the search parameters, search terms were 
                                                                                                                   
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD., (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/ abstract= 1986461  
(analyzing breach litigation); Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The FTC and the New 
Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014) (discussing FTC cases). 
 
46  See Joel R. Reidenberg, N. Cameron Russell, Alexander J. Callen, and Sophia Qasir, 
Privacy Enforcement Actions (Fordham CLIP: June 2014), available at 
http://law.fordham.edu/assets/CLIP/CLIP_Privacy_Case_Report_-_FINAL.pdf 
(cataloging and listing all the cases compiled for this Article). 
 
47  WestlawNext - “Trial Court Documents – Pleadings.”  This database offers full-text 
search for complaints, answers, petitions, and other pleadings.  Document type was 
restricted to “Civil Complaints.” 
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selected that would necessarily have to be included in any substantial 
class action litigation concerning Internet privacy policies.  To cast the 
broadest possible net of relevant terms, the search was structured to 
include the following Boolean search term: “personal information” & 
“data” & “privacy” & “online” & “class action!” 
While the results included some false positives, this approach both 
ensured that all sufficiently relevant cases are were identified and 
reduced the risk that a relevant case might be omitted from the final 
report.  This approach also assures that others can reproduce the 
search using the same search terms in the database described, and can 
update the search, as needed, in the future. 
The search was limited temporally to private class action 
complaints filed between February 12, 1999 and November 11, 2013.  
This date filter was applied to garner meaningful results capturing the 
current trends, as well as match the period of FTC online privacy 
cases.  It also provided a manageable number of results.48 
2. Results 
This search generated 661 federal cases. These results were 
narrowed to 620 relevant cases in federal court proceedings. The 
complaints for these proceedings were then individually reviewed and 
filtered according to document type and content. Non-complaint 
documents that had been included within the search results (such as 
Petitions), cases unrelated to online privacy (such as securities-related 
cases, or those alleging offline or non-privacy related deceptive trade 
practices), and those involving online privacy issues on mobile devices 
were excluded from review  Any duplicate complaints were also 
omitted.  When an amended complaint was included, only the most 
recent complaint was reviewed and added to the data set.  
Frequently, many complaints were filed arising from the same 
event or incident.  For example, forty-nine complaints were filed 
against Sony Computer Entertainment America arising from a data 
breach that exposed customers’ personally identifiable information; 
twenty-four complaints were filed against Countrywide Financial 
Corporation for unauthorized disclosure of customer information; and 
three complaints were filed against Google for collecting unencrypted 
data sent over wireless networks that was gathered while collecting 
 
 
 
 
48  The ultimate search inquiry read: advanced: (personal & information & data & privacy & 
online) & (“Class Action”) & DA(aft 01-01-2003) & DT(((COMPLAINT PETITION) % 
(REPLY RESPONSE ANSWER COUNTER-CLAIM COUNTER-PETITION CROSS-CLAIM 
COUNTER-COMPLAINT))). 
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images for Google Street View.49 In instances such as these, we made a 
determination as to whether a group of complaints arose from a single 
“discrete event,” and, if so, the event was used as the trigger for the 
harm analysis.  We based this determination on the identity of the 
named defendant, the date the action was filed, the allegations 
contained in the complaint, and the asserted causes of action.  
Ultimately, the data set for analysis consisted of 165 class action 
cases arising from approximately eighty-nine discrete events. 
3.  Role of Jurisdiction and Competence 
Private litigants who sue in federal court for violations of online 
privacy rights bring claims under federal, state, and common law.  The 
types of claims that litigants could bring were limited by three main 
factors:  (1) litigants’ ability to establish standing, (2) pleading a 
cognizable cause of action, and (3) plausibly alleging a class action.   
This section will discuss the ability of private party litigants to 
bring class action suits for online privacy violations in terms of these 
three potential limitations. 
a. Standing 
The U.S. Constitution limits those who can bring suit through the 
Article III standing requirement. A plaintiff can only bring an action 
against a party who caused the plaintiff to suffer a concrete and 
particularized injury that is capable of redress.50 A remote or 
speculative injury is insufficient to establish standing.51 
Standing is particularly difficult to establish in online privacy 
cases because the nature of the harm has not yet been defined.52  
Whether a putative class can establish standing may depend on the 
asserted cause of action.53  Although lack of standing is a defense that 
 
 
 
 
49 Privacy Enforcement Actions, infra note 58, at 27–28. 
 
50  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997). 
 
51  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 556 (holding that environmentalists lacked standing to challenge the 
Endangered Species Act because they had no concrete plan to visit the affected species); 
see also Low v. LinkedIn, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that plaintiffs 
lacked standing because they failed to assert a concrete and particularized injury). 
 
52  See, e.g., Jacqueline D. Lipton, Mapping Online Privacy, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 477 (2010).   
 
53  See, e.g., Low, F. Supp. 2d at 1021, 1028–29 (holding that plaintiffs had standing under 
the Stored Communications Act, but not under the False Advertising Law); Claridge v. 
RockYou, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 2d 855, 861 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (finding that plaintiffs had met 
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the defendant may assert, a party seeking to bring a lawsuit must 
nevertheless establish at the pleading stage that they suffered an 
injury or one of their legally cognizable rights was invaded.54 
Furthermore, because our study was limited to complaints filed in 
federal court, litigants must satisfy the requirements for federal 
jurisdiction.  This requirement, however, is not likely a significant bar 
to bringing suit within this study’s data set because, as discussed 
below, many complaints alleged claims arising under federal law.   
b. Cause of Action 
The greatest limit on bringing an action for an invasion of online 
privacy is establishing or determining a cause of action.  While the 
complained-of conduct may fit into common law causes of action, 
such as breach of implied contract, conversion, or negligence, for 
example, there are few statutory and no common law actions that deal 
directly with issues of online privacy.  Scholarship in the field 
highlights the gaps in existing law and demonstrates the need for, and 
provides suggestions for, significant reform in this area.55   
c. Class Action Requirement 
If a cause of action is available, litigants will still need to establish 
eligibility for class certification.  To be certified as a class action, a 
putative class must meet the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.  Under Rule 23 (a):  
                                                                                                                   
the general pleading requirements for standing, but had failed to allege more particularized 
elements of the injury for individual cases of action). But see In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 
791 F. Supp. 2d 705 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (finding that plaintiffs had standing to bring claim 
under the Wiretap Act).  
 
54  Claridge, 785 F. Supp. 2d at 861. 
 
55  See, e.g., Reidenberg, supra note 41; Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The 
Benefits and Costs of Online Privacy Legislation, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 85 (2002); Robert 
Sprague & Corey Ciocchetti, Preserving Identities:  Protecting Personal Identifying 
Information Through Enhanced Privacy Policies and Laws, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 91 
(2009); Timothy J. Van Hal, Note, Taming the Golden Goose:  Private Companies, 
Consumer Geolocation Data, and the Need for a Class Action Regime for Privacy 
Protection, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 713 (2013).  For a contrasting view, see Catherine 
Schmierer, Better Late than Never:  How the Online Advertising Industry’s Response to 
Proposed Privacy Legislation Eliminates the Need for Regulation, 12 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 13 
(2011). 
 
2015] REIDENBERG 501 
 
“(1) the class [must be] so numerous that joinder of all 
members is impossible, (2) there are questions of law 
or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses 
of the representative parties are typical of the claims or 
defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties 
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 
class.”56 
If the class is seeking money damages under Rule 23(b)(3), then, in 
addition to fulfilling the requirements of Rule 23(a), the class must 
establish that the common questions of law or fact are predominant to 
any individualized issues, and that litigating the issue as a class action 
is the superior method of resolving the dispute fairly and efficiently.57 
Although the issue of class certification is litigated after the initial 
pleading stages, the issue is nevertheless relevant at the pleadings 
stage because the putative class must at least plausibly establish its 
appropriateness in the complaint.  The class action pleading 
requirement, however, is likely not a significant deterrent to filing 
suits involving invasions of online privacy because whether a company 
engaged in actionable conduct would affect many, if not all, of the 
company’s customers. 
4. Federal Claims 
This section will discuss the most common federal statutory 
provisions under which litigants sue.58  Most of the reviewed 
complaints were brought under three federal statutes: the Stored 
Communications Act59 (59 cases, 36 percent), the Electronic 
 
 
 
 
56  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 
57  FED. R. CIV. R. 23(b)(3). 
 
58  For a detailed overview of the claims asserted, see Joel R. Reidenberg, N. Cameron 
Russell, Alexander J. Callen, and Sophia Qasir, Privacy Enforcement Actions (Fordham 
CLIP: June 2014) http://law.fordham.edu/assets/CLIP/CLIP_Privacy_Case_Report_-
_FINAL.pdf  (hereinafter “Privacy Enforcement Actions”) (cataloging and listing all the 
cases compiled for this Article.). 
 
59  Stored Communications Act, Pub. L. No. 99–502, 100 Stat. 1860 (codified as amended 
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2006)). 
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Communications Privacy Act60 (82 cases, 50 percent), and the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act61 (51 cases, 31 percent).62   
The Stored Communications Act (SCA) makes it illegal for 
someone to, without permission, “obtain[ ], alter[ ], or prevent[] 
authorized access to[, ] a wire or electronic communication while it is 
in electronic storage.”63 The statute also provides a civil cause of 
action for private litigants that specifies a minimum penalty of $1,000 
and allows for the availability of punitive damages.64 
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) also provides 
a private right of action.  ECPA makes it unlawful to “intentionally 
intercept[], endeavor[] to intercept, or procure[] any other person to 
intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic 
communication.”65  ECPA allows prevailing plaintiffs to collect as 
damages the greater of $100 per day for each day of the violation or 
$10,000.66  
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) is an anti-hacking 
statute that prohibits unauthorized individuals from accessing or 
conspiring to access a computer for restricted data.67 The CFAA 
provides a private right of action and allows individuals who have 
suffered damage or sustained a loss due to a violation of this statute to 
collect compensatory damages, injunctive relief, or other equitable 
relief.68 
 
 
 
 
60  Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–508, 100 Stat. 1848 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).  
 
61  Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–474, 100 Stat. 1213 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. 1030). 
 
62  Privacy Enforcement Actions, supra note 58, at 30. As class action complaints 
commonly plead multiple causes of action, the percentage breakdown, when totaled, 
exceeds 100 percent. 
 
63  18 U.S.C. § 2701 (a). 
 
64  Id. at § 2707 (c). 
 
65  Id. § 2511(1)(a). 
 
66  Id. § 2520(c)(2). 
 
67  Id. § 1030(a).  The CFAA also includes a criminal component for unauthorized access of 
government computers or accessing information relating to the national defense or foreign 
affairs.  Id.  Discussion of those provisions, however, is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 
68  Id. § 1030(g). 
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5. Ancillary State Law Claims 
This section will discuss the most frequent state law claims 
asserted under ancillary jurisdiction in federal litigation.69  These state 
claims involve both statutory law and state common law.  The most 
frequent statutory state law claims arose under California law, 
including California’s Unfair Competition Law70 (76 cases, 46 
percent), the Consumer Legal Remedies Act71 (47 cases, 28 percent), 
Computer Criminal Law72 (36 cases, 22 percent), Invasion of Privacy73 
(22 cases, 13 percent), and False Advertising Law74 (13 cases, 8 
percent), among others.75 
Privacy claims are often brought under state statutes prohibiting 
unfair competition and deceptive business practices that harm 
consumers.76  Courts tend to determine whether a practice is “unfair” 
or “deceptive” on an ad hoc basis, depending on the particular context.  
For example, some online privacy complaints alleged that websites’ 
engaged in unfair or deceptive practices when they told consumers 
that they would not share or disclose personally identifiable 
information and then did so.77  Other complaints alleged that websites 
misled consumers about what personal information would be 
collected.78  In California, the violation of the Unfair Competition Law 
 
 
 
 
69  For a more detailed overview of the claims asserted, see Privacy Enforcement Actions, 
supra note 58 (cataloging and listing all the cases compiled for this Article). 
 
70  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2014). Of the reviewed complaints, 76 alleged 
violation of the California Unfair Competition Law.   
 
71  CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1750 (West 2014). 
 
72  CAL. PENAL CODE § 502 (West 2014). 
 
73  CAL. PENAL CODE § 630 (West 2014). 
 
74  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (West 2014). 
 
75  The percentages do not equal 100% due to overlaps in the case claims.  Because most 
reviewed complaints were filed in California, they tended to assert California state law 
claims.  Litigants, however, have also brought claims under unfair or deceptive trade 
practice statutes of various other states, including Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, New 
York, and Texas.  See Privacy Enforcement Actions, supra note 58, at 30–31.   
 
76  See Privacy Enforcement Actions, supra note 58, at 30-31. 
 
77  See Privacy Enforcement Actions, supra note 58. 
 
78  See Privacy Enforcement Actions, supra note 58. 
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entitles prevailing plaintiffs only to injunctive relief or restitution.79  
The Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) also prohibits unfair and 
deceptive trade practices.80  Unlike the Unfair Competition Law, 
however, the CLRA allows prevailing to litigants to collect damages,81 
punitive damages,82 and reasonable attorneys’ fees.83 
Another set of statutory privacy claims arise under state computer 
crime laws enacted to parallel the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act.84  For example, California’s Computer Crimes Law makes it 
unlawful for any individual to gain unauthorized access to a computer, 
computer system, or computer network.85  In addition to imposing 
criminal penalties, the statute allows injured parties to bring a civil 
action to recover compensatory damages or seek injunctive relief.86  
Private litigants may also be entitled to recover attorneys’ fees.87 
Lastly, there are also a number of specific state statutes addressing 
invasions of privacy that are asserted by litigants.88  For example, the 
California state legislature enacted an “Invasion of Privacy” statute to 
protect the “free exercise of personal liberties” that is threatened by 
technological developments of devices that eavesdrop on private 
communications and invade citizens’ privacy rights.89  Although the 
invasion of privacy statute is a criminal statute, injured parties may 
bring civil actions for damages, to recover the greater of $5,000 or 
treble damages sustained by the plaintiff, or for injunctive relief.90  
 
 
 
 
79  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17203 (West 2014).  If the state attorney general or a district 
attorney brings a civil action on behalf of the people of the State of California, then the 
violator may be subject to a civil penalty not exceeding $2,500 per violation.  Id. § 17206. 
 
80  See CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1770 (listing practices proscribed by the statute). 
 
81  In a class action, the total award of damages must be greater than $1000. CAL. CIV. CODE 
§ 1780(a)(1). 
 
82  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1780(a)(4). 
 
83  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1780(e). 
 
84  See Privacy Enforcement Actions, supra note 58, at 30-31. 
 
85  CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(c).  
 
86  CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(e)(1). 
 
87  CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(e)(2). 
 
88  See Privacy Enforcement Actions, supra note 58, at 30–31. 
 
89  CAL. PENAL CODE § 630. 
 
90  CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.2. 
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Unlike other statutes, a plaintiff (or class of plaintiffs) need not 
sustain, or be threatened with, actual damages.91 
With respect to the common law, complaints frequently allege a 
number of contract and quasi-contractual claims, such as breach of 
contract (52 cases, 32 percent), breach of implied contract (29 cases, 
18 percent), breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing (19 cases, 12 percent), and breach of express or implied 
warranty (7 cases, 4 percent).92  Litigants also include claims for a 
range of common law torts, including negligence (36 cases, 22 
percent), intentional or negligent misrepresentation (7 cases, 4 
percent), a privacy tort93 (65 cases, 39 percent), conversion (17 cases, 
10 percent), bailment (7 cases, 4 percent), and unjust enrichment (87 
cases, 53 percent).94 
Complaints alleging contractual claims proceed on the premise 
that the privacy policy creates a contract between the website and the 
user, and that the policy will govern the website’s use of individuals’ 
personally identifiable information.95 Contract claims have been 
brought for a range of cases.96  In these suits, litigants allege that 
websites collected or disseminated private information—even if the 
user may have initially disclosed that information voluntarily.  For 
example, litigants sued Facebook over the “Friend Finder Service” 
because the tool used images of the user for advertising purposes.97  
Intrusion upon seclusion and public disclosure of private fact claims 
                                                                                                                   
 
91  CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.2(c). 
 
92  See Privacy Enforcement Actions, supra note 58, at 31–32. 
 
93  Privacy torts are categorized as one of four possible actions:  intrusion upon seclusion, 
public disclosure of private fact, false light, and appropriation. 
 
94  See Privacy Enforcement Actions, supra note 58, at 31–32 for a full range of the claims 
raised by litigants in online privacy lawsuits.  
 
95  See, e.g., Gould v. Facebook, Inc., Case No. 10-cv-02389 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2010); 
Robertson v. Facebook, Inc., Case No. 10-cv-02408 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2010); Claridge v. 
Rockyou, Inc., Case No. 09-cv-06032-PJH (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2011); Carson v. Lendingtree 
LLC, Case No. 08-cv-00247 (W.D.N.C. May 30, 2008); Yunker v. Pandora Media, Case No. 
11-cv-3113 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013); In re LinkedIn User Privacy Litig., Case No. 12-cv-
03088 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2014); Johnson v. Microsoft, Inc., Case No. 06-cv-00900-RSM 
(W.D. Wash. July 28, 2011); see also Privacy Enforcement Actions, supra note 58. 
 
96  See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960); see also Patricia 
Sánchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 8–9 
(2007) (noting that Prosser’s four categories of privacy torts have been incorporated into 
modern American jurisprudence). 
 
97  See Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., Case No. 10-cv-05282-RS (N.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2011). 
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were also raised against companies that allegedly installed spyware 
that directed users’ communications to a third party advertiser,98 
failed to secure users’ personal information,99 made users’ search data 
available on a public website,100 or shared customer information 
without consent.101 False light claims were alleged when a website 
aggregated online activity of users to create and sell databases based 
on their interests and preferences.102 General invasion of privacy 
claims were asserted in cases where the defendant circumvented 
users’ browser’s privacy settings to collect information103 or collected 
(or disseminated) information without users’ consent.104 
Less frequent, but also asserted by litigants, were the common law 
claims for two variants to trespass to property.105 The first was 
conversion.  Conversion is a civil equivalent for a theft infraction—
when one person exercises a property right inconsistent with that of 
another.106  In an online context, litigants have asserted claims for 
 
 
 
 
98  See, e.g., Valentine v. Wideopen W. Fin., Case No. 09-cv-07653 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 
2012); Green v. Cable One, Inc., Case No. 10-cv-00259 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 3, 2010); Mortensen 
v. Bresnan Commc'n, Case No. 10-cv-00013 (D. Mont. July 15, 2013). 
 
99  See, e.g., Penson v. Amazon, Case No. 12-cv-00340 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 27, 2012); Elliot v. 
Amazon, Case No. 12-cv-00341 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 27, 2012); Stevens v. Amazon, Case No. 12-
cv-00339 (W.D. Ky. Sept 27, 2012); Carson v. Lendingtree LLC, Case No. 08-cv-00247 
(W.D.N.C. July 23, 2008); Spinozzi v. Lendingtree LLC, Case No. 08-cv-00229 (W.D.N.C. 
July 23, 2008); Low v. LinkedIn Corp., Case No. 11-CV-01468-LHK (C.D. Cal. July 12, 
2012). 
 
100  See, e.g., Doe v. AOL LLC, Case No. 06-cv-05866 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2009). 
 
101  See, e.g., Gaos v. Google, Inc., Case No. 10-cv-04809 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2013); Walker 
v. Facebook, Case No. 12-cv-00798 (D. Mont.); Quinn v. Facebook, Case No. 12-cv-00797 
(D. Haw.). 
 
102  Complaint, Couch v. Space Pencil, No. 05606, 2011 WL 5924382 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 
2011); see also Gutierrez v. Instagram, Inc., No. 6550, 2012 WL 6709572 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 
27, 2012). 
 
103  See, e.g., Frohberg v. Media Innovative Grp. LLC, Case No. 12-cv-02674-WFK-JO 
(E.D.N.Y.); Mazzone v. Vibrant Media Inc., Case No. 12-cv-02672-NGG-JO (E.D.N.Y.); In 
re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig., Case No. 12-md-02358-SLR (D. 
Del.). 
 
104  See, e.g., Virtue v. Myspace, Inc., Case No. 11-cv-01800-RRM –RML (E.D.N.Y.) 
(bringing an invasion of privacy claim for the unauthorized disclosure of personal 
information and browsing history); Simios v. 180Solutions, Inc., Case No. 05-cv-05235 
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 14, 2006) (Invasion of privacy claim asserted for causing spyware that 
tracked plaintiffs’ Internet activity to be downloaded on users’ computer). 
 
105 See Privacy Enforcement Actions, supra note 58. 
 
106 18 AM. JUR. 2d Conversion § 80 (describing acts constituting conversion). 
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conversion in situations when a company uses the personal 
information of its users without proper compensation or 
permission,107 circumvents privacy controls to collect personal 
information,108 or fails to secure private information.109  
The second set of trespass claims asserted is bailment 
infringements.  Bailment exists when the owner of property (the 
bailor) entrusts another person (the bailee) with possession of 
property for a limited period, after which the bailee must return the 
property to the bailor.110  Litigants proceeding with a claim for 
bailment in an online context alleged that they entrusted personal 
information to a website (the “bailor”), who then failed to keep that 
information secure.111 
B. Federal Trade Commission Enforcement Actions 
The enforcement actions of the Federal Trade Commission reflect 
the consumer harms that the FTC perceives to be most important and 
that fall within the FTC’s jurisdiction.  To determine the nature of 
these harms, we reviewed FTC complaints, which were available via 
the FTC website as of November 11, 2013 and which the FTC 
categorized as relating to privacy issues. 
1.  Search Parameters 
The FTC categorized its enforcement actions and published the 
relevant complaints on the agency’s website.  These complaints were 
accessible from the FTC’s homepage (http://www.ftc.gov/) by 
following the links to “Consumer Protection” → “Business 
Information” → “Legal Resources” → “Privacy and Security” on the 
                                                                                                                   
 
107  See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Instagram, Inc., Case No. C 12-6550 (N.D. Cal.); Low v. LinkedIn 
Corp., Case No. 11-CV-01468-LHK (C.D. Cal.); Leong v. Myspace, Case No. CV-10-8366 
(C.D. Cal.); Gudac v. Zynga Games, Case No. 10-cv-04793 (N.D. Cal.).  
 
108  See, e.g., Nobles v. Google, Inc., Case No. 12-cv-03589-LB (N.D. Cal.) (circumvented 
controls); Maguire v. Facebook, Inc., Case No. 12-cv-0807 (N.D. Cal.) (surreptitious 
collection); Feist v. RNC Corp., Case No. 11-cv-05436 (S.D.N.Y.) (monitored, intercepted, 
and manipulated users’ search histories). 
 
109  See, e.g., Elkhettab v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., Case No. 08-cv-00638 (C.D. Cal.). 
 
110  U.C.C. art. 7 (2003); 8A AM. JUR. 2d Bailments § 28. 
 
111  See, e.g., Bell v. Blizzard Entm’t., Case No. 12-cv-09475 (C.D. Cal.); Gutierrez v. 
Instagram, Inc., Case No. C 12-6550 (N.D. Cal.); Moses v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., Case 
No. 08-cv-05416 (C.D. Cal.); Funes v. Instagram, Inc., Case No. 12-civ-6482 (N.D. Cal.). 
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dropdown menu → “select subtopic” on the second dropdown menu.  
The relevant subtopics were:  (1) Children’s Privacy, (2) Consumer 
Privacy, (3) Data Security, and (4) the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.112  No 
keywords or electronic searches were necessary to identify these cases, 
as the FTC’s website provided a chronological list of cases for each of 
above-listed subcategories as of the research period for this study.  
Some cases included multiple complaints.  In these instances, only 
the oldest complaint for that case was reviewed.113  The earliest 
complaint reviewed by Fordham CLIP dated to February 12, 1999, 
while the most recent complaint reviewed dated to October 22, 2013. 
2. Results 
According to the FTC’s website, there were a total of 116 distinct 
cases.114  The distribution of these cases, as of November 11, 2013, 
within the FTC’s broad categories was as follows: 
● Children’s Privacy - 23 cases 
● Consumer Privacy - 46 cases 
● Data Security - 50 cases 
● Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act - 26 cases  
3. Role of Jurisdiction and Competence 
The enabling statute of the FTC has a crucial impact on the way 
the FTC’s privacy enforcement claims are brought.  Congress passed 
the Federal Trade Commission Act (the “Act”) on September 26, 1914 
that established the FTC and sought to protect American consumers 
from wrongful business practices.115  The Act, as amended, prohibits 
 
 
 
 
112  The report did not include FTC complaints subcategorized as relating to (1) Credit 
Reporting, (2) the Red Flags Rule, or (3) the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor, as these are not 
specifically relevant to online privacy, unless such complaints were cross-listed in one of 
the other four categories. 
 
113  There is one exception, where the second, newer complaint was used, because the FTC 
had a broken link to the oldest complaint for In re Educational Research Center of 
America, Inc.; Student Marketing Group, Inc.; Marian Sanjana; and Jan Stumacher, File 
No. 022 3249, Docket C-4079 (2003). 
 
114  See Privacy Enforcement Actions, supra note 58, at 4.  Some cases involved multiple 
claims and were cross-listed among multiple categories. 
 
115  See ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58). 
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the “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce”116  and 
empowers the FTC to enforce these prohibitions.117  Congress has 
expanded the FTC’s jurisdiction over the years, and today the FTC 
enforces or administers more than seventy laws, including a wide 
variety of consumer protection laws spanning areas from credit 
reporting to telemarketing.118  For online privacy, however, the FTC’s 
jurisdiction only extends to unfair and deceptive practices.  
The enabling statute’s limitation to unfair and deceptive practices 
severely circumscribes the agency’s authority over online privacy 
issues.  Despite the progressive expansion of its overall powers, the 
FTC still lacks explicit statutory authority to generally protect online 
consumer privacy.  The FTC’s general privacy efforts must rely on the 
authority under Section 5 of the Act to “prevent” persons “from using . 
. . unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”119   
The FTC has long defined a deceptive practice as a 
“representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead the 
consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer's 
detriment.”120  Typically, the FTC looks to whether or not a person or 
company broke a promise or engaged in a misleading act.  The 
archetypical scenario involves a company’s breach of its own privacy 
policy.  Under this deception theory, a company would be permitted, 
without repercussion, either to tell consumers whether and how their 
personal information will be exploited, provided it upholds its word; 
or to promise them nothing about their online privacy at all.  In other 
words, under the deception theory, the FTC could pursue a company 
for violating its own privacy policy, but it could not require that 
company to have a privacy policy in the first place. Nor could it 
require specific provisions in a company’s online privacy policy.  This 
limited authority “leads to the curious situation whereby a company 
without a privacy policy is arguably less likely to be punished for 
 
 
 
 
116  See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). 
 
117  See id. §§ 41, 45. 
 
118  See About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc (last visited Feb. 
24, 2014); Statutes Enforced or Administered by the Commission, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/statutes (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
 
119  See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2); see also About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
 
120  FTC Policy Statement on Deception, Appended to Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 
174 (1984), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc-policy-statement-on-deception (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2014). 
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privacy invasive practices than a company with a privacy policy.”121  
Indeed, the vast majority of complaints the FTC has brought under 
Section 5 have alleged deception. 
With respect to “unfair practices,” the FTC defines such a practice 
as one that “causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to 
consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers 
themselves and is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to 
consumers or competition.”122  Unlike deception, an unfair practice 
does not require breach of an overt promise or act.  Substantial harm 
typically involves monetary, health, or safety injuries and excludes 
speculative, subjective or emotional harms like those often claimed in 
privacy cases.123   
Not surprisingly, the FTC invokes unfairness less frequently than 
it invokes deception.  This is because unfair practices are often harder 
to demonstrate and prove as compared to deceptive practices.  For 
example, in the case of FTC v. Wyndham,124 the FTC alleged that 
Wyndham “failed to employ reasonable and appropriate measures to 
protect personal information against unauthorized access,” and that 
such failure is inherently unfair.  Wyndham contested the FTC’s 
assessment, arguing that the FTC did not establish clear standards for 
data security by which to abide.125  However, as Professors Daniel J. 
Solove and Woodrow Hartzog have observed, the FTC’s collective 
“data security jurisprudence forms a rather detailed list of inadequate 
security practices.”126 They contend that the FTC can show 
unreasonableness by relying upon departures from industry standards 
regarding data security—standard practices which the FTC itself has 
encouraged over the years through targeted enforcement activities.127  
 
 
 
 
121  See Federal Trade Commission:  Overview of Statutory Authority to Remedy Privacy 
Infringements, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., http://epic.org//privacy/internet/ftc/ 
Authority.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
 
122  15 U.S.C. § 45(n). 
 
123  FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness Appended to Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 
1070 (1984). 
 
124  See FTC v. Wyndham, Complaint, FTC File. No. 1023142 (June 26, 2012), 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/06/120626wyndamhotelsc
mpt.pdf.  Wyndham has thusfar unsuccessfully challenged the FTC decision in court.  See 
FTC v. Wyndham, D. N.J. Case 2:13-cv-01887-ES-JAD (Opinion, Apr. 7, 2014). 
 
125  See FTC v. Wyndham, D. N.J. Case 2:13-cv-01887-ES-JAD (Opinion, Apr. 7, 2014) 
(denying Wyndham’s motion to dismiss). 
 
126  See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 45. 
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Indeed, as Professors Breaux and Baumer have shown, the FTC cases 
over a recent ten-year period establish a set of “reasonable” security 
standards.128 
Beyond the authority to pursue unfair and deceptive practices, 
Congress has granted the FTC enforcement authority for particular 
practices mandated by two other statutes.  Specifically, the Children's 
Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”) restricts the online 
collection of personal information directly from children under the 
age of 13 without parental consent.129 And, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act (“GLBA”) requires financial institutions to develop privacy policies 
and notify consumers of them at least annually, as well as provide 
consumers opportunities to “opt out” from disclosures of personal 
financial information to unaffiliated third parties.130  These statutes 
provide a narrower and less frequently asserted, purview for FTC 
enforcement of online privacy than does Section 5’s “unfair and 
deceptive practice” jurisdiction.  
In short, aside from “unfair and deceptive practices” and the 
narrowly defined COPPA and GLBA practices, the FTC does not have 
legal jurisdiction to protect consumers from other online privacy 
harms.  Due to these jurisdictional limitations, the FTC must frame 
any enforcement actions to fit within the existing authority.  As a 
result, when the FTC seeks to redress a new form of online privacy 
harm, it must be framed in the complaint as either an “unfair” or a 
“deceptive” practice or be within the narrow protections of COPPA 
and GLBA.131 
IV. TYPOLOGY OF HARMS 
Once we identified the relevant complaints brought by the FTC 
and private litigants, we looked beyond the formal formulation of the 
claim or cause of action to determine a typology of the underlying 
harms being asserted in each litigation event.  This approach looked to 
                                                                                                                   
127  See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 45, at 52–53. 
 
128  See Travis D. Breaux & David Baumer, Legally “Reasonable” Security Requirements: A 
10-Year FTC Retrospective, 30 COMPUTERS & SECURITY 178 (2011). 
 
129  See Pub. L. 105–277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506); 16 
C.F.R. § 312. 
 
130  See Pub. L. 106–102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended in relevant part at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809 and §§ 6821–6827). 
 
131  See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 45. 
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the true substance of the wrongful event rather than the way a claim 
was formulated to fit within the existing constraints of the legal 
landscape.  We organized the vast amount of complaint data by 
themes that were apparent from the claims and their situational 
contexts.  In effect, this is a categorization of the harms as articulated 
by the claims.  The harms that were most frequently asserted were (1) 
unauthorized disclosure of personal information, (2) surreptitious 
collection of personal information, (3) failure to secure personal 
information, and (4) unlawful retention of personal information.   
These categories are similar to those identified by Professors 
Solove and Hartzog.132  Solove and Hartzog focused exclusively on the 
FTC’s Section 5 actions and categorize privacy actions that alleged 
“deception” or “unfairness.”  Their categories for claims based on 
deception were: 1) broken promises of privacy; 2) general deception; 
3) insufficient notice, and 4) data security.  For unfairness based 
claims, their categories were:  1) retroactive changes; 2) deceitful data 
collection; 3) improper use of data; 4) unfair design or unfair default 
settings; and 5) unfair data security practices.133   
In contrast to Solove and Hartzog’s work, this study examines a 
combination of FTC actions and private lawsuits to identify a more 
complete typology that includes data from all existing federal avenues 
for bringing online privacy claims. Our unauthorized disclosure harms 
are somewhat more inclusive and correspond to several of Solove and 
Hartzog’s categories, namely their classification of improper use and 
design/default setting claims under the FTC’s unfair practice prong 
and broken promises and general deception under the FTC’s deceptive 
practice prong.  The surreptitious collection harms match Solove and 
Hartzog’s deceitful collection (unfairness) and general deception along 
with insufficient notice (deception). And, the security harms are the 
same as Solove and Hartzog’s, though Solove and Hartzog do not 
address retention as a separate issue. Our distinct and broader 
categories of harm derive from the examination of a combination of 
both class action litigation and the FTC settlements.   
This section discusses the typology of the four sets of identified 
harms and presents examples of some of the alleged wrongful actions 
underlying them. 
 
 
 
 
132  See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 45. 
 
133  See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 45. 
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A. Unauthorized Disclosure of Personal Information 
The privacy enforcement actions reflect a profound desire to 
remedy unauthorized disclosures of personal information. The cases 
emphasize that disclosures of personal information collected from 
website users and given to third parties without the clear permission 
of users is perceived as a wrongful act. These types of disclosures arise 
in various circumstances, ranging from ordinary commercial 
transactions to cases involving social media.134 For example, several 
private actions were filed against AMR Corporation, an airline, for 
disclosing customer information in violation of a stated privacy 
policy.135  Social networking services, like Zynga,136 Facebook,137 
Pandora,138 Myspace,139 and LinkedIn,140 are also popular defendants 
accused of transmitting or selling user information to third parties 
without user consent.  In the private actions against Facebook, 
litigants complained of Facebook’s use of users’ names and 
photographs for advertising purposes without permission.141  The FTC 
also accused Facebook of misleading consumers into believing they 
could restrict access to their information.142  It further alleged that 
Facebook had retroactively applied material changes to the sites 
 
 
 
 
134  See, e.g., In re Microsoft Corp., Complaint, File No. 0123240 (Aug. 8, 2002). 
 
135  Complaint, Baldwin v. AMR Corp., No. 04-00750 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2004); Complaint, 
Kimmell v. AMR Corp., No. 04-00750 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2004); Complaint, Rosenberg v. 
AMR Corp., No. 04-02564 (E.D.N.Y. July 9, 2004). 
 
136  In re Zynga Privacy Litig., No. 10-04680 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2011); see also Albini v. 
Zynga, Case No. 10-4723 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2010); Graf v. Zynga Game Network, Inc., Case 
No. 10-04680-JW (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2010); Gudac v. Zynga Games, Case No. 10-04793 
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2010); Schreiber v. Zynga Game Network, Case No. 10-4794 (N.D. Cal. 
Oct. 22, 2010). 
 
137  In re Facebook Consumer Privacy Litig., No. 10-00429 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2010). 
 
138  Deacon v. Pandora Media, Inc., Case No. 11-cv-04674-LB (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011); 
Yunker v. Pandora Media, Inc., Case No. 11-cv-3113 (N.D. Cal. May 30, 2013). 
 
139  Leong v. Myspace, Case No. 10-8366 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2010); Virtue v. Myspace, Inc., 
Case No. 11-01800 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2011). 
 
140  In re LinkedIn User Privacy Litig., No. 12-03088 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2013). 
 
141  E.K.D. v. Facebook, Inc., Case No. 12-cv-01216-LHK (S.D. Ill. June 1, 2011); Cohen v. 
Facebook, Inc., Case No. 10-cv-05282-RS (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2011); Fraley v. Facebook, 
Inc., Case No. 11-cv-01726 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2011). 
 
142  In re Facebook, Inc., Complaint, File No. 092 3184 (Dec. 5, 2011). 
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privacy settings, without informed consent, resulting in disclosure of 
information that had previously been restricted.143 
Several private suits were also brought against Netflix for sharing 
users’ video viewing history without properly removing associated 
personally identifiable information.144  In one FTC action, a toy 
retailer represented that personal information would only be used to 
“personalize your online experience,” but later sought bankruptcy 
approval to transfer information to third parties.145  In another, a 
pharmaceutical company disclosed customer information in an 
email's “To:” line.146  Finally, the FTC pursued an educational products 
company that decided to allow the rental of personal data to third 
parties without seeking consumer consent, even though it had 
explicitly promised to inform users of material changes to its privacy 
policy.147  
B. Surreptitious Collection of Personal Information 
Another important harm perceived by users is the surreptitious 
collection of personal information by websites.  Surreptitious 
collection arises when a defendant collects information about a user 
without adequate disclosure.  In some cases, companies disclosed 
some but not all of the types of information collected. In others, they 
disclosed some but not all means of collection or sources targeted for 
collection,148 as in cases involving undisclosed history sniffing.149  In 
still others, data collection was effectuated through the use of 
spyware,150 phishing,151 or pre-texting.152 In a series of actions, the FTC 
 
 
 
 
143  Id. 
 
144  Comstock v. Netflix, Inc., No. 11-01219 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2011); Rura v. Netflix, Inc., 
No. 11-01075 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2011); Bernal v. Netflix, No. 11-00820 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 
2011); Milans v. Netflix, No. 11-03079 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2011); Doe v. Netflix, No. 09-
05903 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2009). 
 
145  FTC v. Toysmart.com, LLC, Complaint, File No. X000075, Case No. 00-11341-RGS, ¶¶ 
9–11 (D. Mass July 10, 2000). 
 
146  In re Eli Lilly and Company, Complaint, File No. 012 3214 (Jan. 18, 2002). 
 
147  In re Gateway Learning Corp., Complaint, File No. 0423047 (July 7, 2004). 
 
148  In re Path, Inc., Complaint, File No. 122 3158 (Feb. 1, 2013). 
 
149  See, e.g., In re Epic Marketplace, Inc., Complaint, File No. 112 3182 (Dec. 5, 2012). 
 
150  See, e.g., Complaint, Mortensen v. Bresnan Commc’n, No. 10-cv-00013 (D. Mont. Feb. 
16, 2010); Complaint, Deering v. CenturyTel Inc., No. 10-cv-00012 (D. Mont. Feb. 11, 
2010); Complaint, Green v. Cable One, Inc., No. 10-cv-00259 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 3, 2010); 
2015] REIDENBERG 515 
 
pursued a number of rent-to-own computer companies, who, 
unbeknownst to users, had used key loggers, deployed fake software 
registration input forms, taken screenshots, and remotely operated 
users’ webcams to collect information.153 In other cases, data was 
collected after circumventing users’ privacy settings154 or by 
implementing unauthorized surveillance measures such as cookies.155  
There were cases where companies continued collecting data after 
users opted out of collection or had deactivated or deleted their 
accounts.156  There were also instances involving unfair or deceptive 
instructions, interfaces, or default settings that made it particularly 
onerous for consumers to protect their data.157  Another common 
event giving rise to surreptitious collection claims were websites that 
would install cookies that would continue to collect information about 
the users’ activity, even after they signed out of the website.158 
                                                                                                                   
Complaint, Kirch v. Embarq Mgmt. Co., No. 10-cv-02047 (D. Kan. Jan. 26, 2010); 
Complaint, Valentine v. Wideopen West Finance, No. 09-cv-07653 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 
2008); Amended Complaint, Simios v. 180Solutions, Inc., No. 05-cv-05235 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 
14, 2006); Complaint, Michaeli v. Exact Advertising, No. 05-cv-8331 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 
2005). 
 
151  See, e.g., FTC v. Hill, Complaint, File No. 0323102 (Mar. 22, 2004). 
 
152  See, e.g., FTC v. Information Search, Inc., Complaint, File No. 0623102, Case No. 106-
CV-01099-AMD, (D. Md. Apr. 18 2001). 
 
153  See, e.g., In re Aspen Way Enterprises, Inc., Complaint, File No. 1123151 (Sept. 25, 
2012). 
 
154  See, e.g., In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig., Case No. 12-md-
02358 (D. Del. Dec. 19, 2012); U. S. v. Google, Inc., Complaint, Case No. 512-cv-04177-
HRL (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2012). 
 
155  See, e.g., Couch v. Space Pencil, Case No. 11-cv-05606-LB (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2011); 
Garvey v. Kissmetrics, Case No. CV 11-3764 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2011); Del Vecchio v. 
Amazon.com, Case No. 2:11-cv-00366-RSL (W.D. Wash. Mar. 2, 2011); Bose v. Interclick, 
Inc., Case No. 10-cv-9183 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2010); White v. Clearspring Tech., Case No. 10-
cv-5948 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2010); Davis v. Videoegg, Inc., Case No. CV 10-7112 (CBM) 
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2010); La Court v. Specific Media, Inc., Case No. 10-cv-01256 (C.D. Cal. 
Aug. 18, 2010); Valdez v. Quantcast, Case No. 10-cv-05484 (C.D. Cal. June 23, 2010). 
156  See, e.g., Missaghi v. Blockbuster, Inc., Case No. 11-cv-02559 (D. Minn.); Hodsdon v. 
Bright House Networks LLC, Case No. 2-cv-01580-AWI-JLT (D. Cal.); Hodsdon v. 
DirecTV, Case No. 12-cv-02827 (N.D. Cal.). 
 
157 See, e.g., FTC v. Frostwire LLC, Complaint, File No. 112 3041, Case No. 111-cv-23643 
(S.D. Fl. Oct. 7, 2011); In re HTC America, Inc., Complaint, File No. 122 3049 (Feb. 22, 
2013). 
 
158 See, e.g., In re Facebook Consumer Privacy Litig., No. 10-00429 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 
2010). 
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C. Inadequate Security for Personal Information 
Users see data security failures as a significant harm.  In cases 
brought against parties for failure to secure personal information, the 
wrongful conduct was essentially that the responsible party did not 
implement adequate controls to secure consumers’ personal 
information.159  The FTC is very active in the area of data security, and 
the question of “adequacy” manifests across a wide array of 
procedures, from network security, authorization to access 
information and credentials, employee oversight and training, 
information disposal, breach detection and prevention, and breach 
response.160 
Although there have been fewer “events” in which companies have 
been privately sued for failure to secure customer information 
compared to the other types of harms, the data security litigation 
tends to spawn a large number of individual cases.  Thus, although 
there were only seventeen events identified as security issues, there 
were over ninety-six related private cases filed.161 
D. Wrongful Retention of Personal Information 
Lastly, the complaints reflect that wrongful retention of personal 
information is seen as a noteworthy harm.  Users brought wrongful 
retention claims against companies that failed to destroy personal 
information after the users terminated their relationships with the 
 
 
 
 
159 See, e.g., Complaint, Szpyrka v. LinkedIn, No. 12-cv-03099 (N.D. Cal. June 16, 2012) 
(alleging violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law, the California Consumer Legal 
Remedies Act, breach of contract, breach of implied contract, breach of implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, and negligence); Complaint, Peterson v. Sony Computer 
Entm’t. Am. LLC, No. 11-cv-2242-RS (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2011) (alleging violations of the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, California 
Customer Records Act, California Competition Law, False Advertising Law, California 
Consumer Legal Remedies Act, California Computer Criminal Law § 502, breach of implied 
warranty, breach of express contract, and negligence).  One careful, empirical analysis 
maps the security requirements that emerge from FTC enforcement actions.  See Breaux & 
Baumer, supra note 128 (FTC enforcement actions institutionalize security requirements 
for firms). 
 
160  See, e.g., In re Genica Corporation, Complaint, File No. 0823113 (Feb. 5, 2009); FTC v. 
Wyndham, Complaint, FTC File. No. 1023142 (June 26, 2012); In re TRENDnet, Inc., 
Complaint, File No. 122 3090 (Sept. 4, 2013); In re CVS Caremark Corporation, Complaint, 
File No. 0723119 (June 23, 2009). 
 
161  See Privacy Enforcement Actions, supra note 58, at 28. 
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company.162  Thus, regardless of whether an economic loss occurs, 
such retention of personal information is perceived to harm the 
public.  Many privacy policies are silent as to a users’ ability to remove 
personal information from a website and as to what a company will do 
with the users’ information if the user terminates the relationship.   
There were six FTC complaints alleging improper retention.163  
Half of them involved privacy policies or similar promises.164  The FTC 
brought all six complaints under Section 5.  Two complaints relied on 
the deception theory,165 two on unfairness,166 and two were somewhat 
ambiguous.167 
V. MAPPING A ZONE OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR NOTICE AND CHOICE 
The typology of harms shown through the class action litigation 
and FTC actions provides a useful metric for evaluating the scope of 
effectiveness of the notice and choice regime.  In particular, the 
typology enables us to articulate the zones or areas in which notice 
and choice can and cannot work.  Some of the perceived harms are not 
susceptible to resolution ex ante by notice and choice. Others can be 
addressed by meaningful notice and choice.  This section will discuss 
first those harms that the notice and choice framework effectively 
addresses, followed by a discussion of those harms which are simply 
incurable by a notice and choice regime.  Notwithstanding the 
 
 
 
 
162 See, e.g., Mendoza v. Microsoft, Inc., Case No. 13-cv-00378-DAE (W.D. Tex. May 1, 
2013); Hodsdon v. Bright House Networks LLC, Case No. 12-01580 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 
2012); Burton v. Time Warner Cable Inc., Case No. 2:12-cv-06764 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2012); 
Hodsdon v. DirecTV, Case No. 12-cv-02827 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2012); Priyev v. Google, No. 
13-00093 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 29, 2012); Missaghi v. Blockbuster, Inc., Case No. 11-cv-02559 (D. 
Minn. Sept. 6, 2011); Comstock v. Netflix, Inc., No. 11-01219 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2011); Rura 
v. Netflix, Inc., No. 11-01075 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2011); Bernal v. Netflix, No. 11-00820 (N.D. 
Cal. Feb. 22, 2011); Milans v. Netflix, No. 11-03079 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2011); Doe v. 
Netflix, No. 09-05903 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2009). 
 
163 See Privacy Enforcement Actions, supra note 58, at 20. 
 
164 In re Life is good, Inc., File No. 0723046 (Jan. 17, 2008); In re CBR Systems, Inc., 
Complaint, File No. 1123120 (May 3, 2013); In re Ceridian Corp., Complaint, File No. 
1023160 (June 15, 2011). 
 
165 In re Life is good, Inc., File No. 0723046 (Jan. 17, 2008); In re CBR Systems, Inc., 
Complaint, File No. 1123120 (May 3, 2013). 
 
166 In re BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., Complaint, File No. 0423160 (June 16, 2005); In re 
DSW Inc., Complaint, File No. 0523096 (Dec. 1, 2005). 
 
167 In re Ceridian Corp., Complaint, File No. 1023160 (June 15, 2011); In re CardSystems 
Solutions, Inc., Complaint, File No. 0523148 (Feb. 23, 2006). 
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contents of a particular privacy policy, the latter are plainly outside 
notice and choice’s “zone of effectiveness.”  
A. Areas where Notice and Choice Satisfy User Autonomy 
The basic premise of notice and choice is that individuals have 
autonomy and control over their own information.  The privacy harms 
show that individuals view control as choosing what personal 
information to divulge, when to release it, with whom it will be shared, 
and how the recipient will use it.  Exercising such control effectively, 
however, requires as a prerequisite proper notice describing the 
recipient and the parameters of such recipient’s use and retention of 
the information.  When a notice fails, the issue is not whether a user 
would ever choose to disclose information, but the extent to which the 
user’s choice as to whom and for what purposes has been undermined. 
An accurate, complete and readable notice accompanied by 
meaningful choice can resolve many of the harms categorized as 
unauthorized disclosure, surreptitious collection, and, to a more 
limited extent, improper retention.  The notice must disclose practices 
that are both followed and not inherently “unfair” (as discussed in 
Part III.B.) Notice and choice only averts these privacy violations 
sounding in deception, so long as society does not still deem the 
disclosed practice to be inherently “unfair.” 
1. Unauthorized Disclosure: Sufficiency of Notice as a Cure  
Notices that are complete, understandable for users, accurate, and 
specific can avoid the harm of unauthorized disclosure.  A notice that 
accurately and specifically describes all practices applied to the 
personal data in a way that users will understand establishes the basis 
for user consent. Broad or vague statements as well as 
incomprehensible statements about collection practices may be 
functionally equivalent to the absence of notice. For example, vague 
statements, like “we share your information only with affiliates” would 
not meaningfully communicate the identity of recipients of personal 
information and their uses of the information. Similarly in Sears, a 
notice stated that the company would track “online browsing,” but did 
not adequately explain that tracking “online browsing” supposedly 
embraced a wide variety of collection techniques and data types.168  
Vague notices do not provide users with meaningful information 
 
 
 
 
168 See Complaint, In re Sears Holdings Mgmt. Corp., File No. 0823099 (June 4, 2009). 
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about practices to which they are asked to consent.  Such vague and 
incomplete notices deny users the ability to control their personal 
information.  Consent in such circumstances would be defective and 
users would perceive disclosures as unauthorized.     
By contrast, notice that is complete, accurate, and specific 
regarding the terms that explain how, with whom, and for what 
purpose a user’s information will be shared enables effective consent 
from the user. 
2. Surreptitious Collection: Detailed Notice of Methods of Collection 
and Type of Data Collected 
Like unauthorized disclosure harms, surreptitious collection can 
also be avoided ex ante through proper notice.  If all methods of 
collection and all types of data collected are disclosed, then there is 
nothing surreptitious about a set of collection practices.  Nevertheless, 
surreptitious collection can occur when flagrantly deceptive or unfair 
actions, like phishing or pretexting, are taken to induce disclosure of 
personal information.169 Similarly, spyware may be deployed to collect 
information from unknowing users.170  In these types of cases, both 
the methods of collection and the types of data collected are concealed 
from consumers.  Similarly, in some cases, the data collected is simply 
beyond the scope of terms of the company’s privacy policy.171  The 
harm of surreptitious collection can be avoided ex ante by detailed 
notice of collection methods and data collected.  However, insufficient 
detail in a notice regarding collection practices obliterates the 
possibility of meaningful consent.  Once again, meaningful consent 
requires a notice that completely, accurately, and specifically 
describes each method of data collection and each type of data 
collected.  
 
 
 
 
169 See, e.g., FTC v. Hill, Complaint, File No. 0323102 (Mar. 22 2004); Complaint, FTC v. 
Sun Spectrum Comm. Org., Inc., File No. 0323032, Case No. 03-8110 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 2, 
2003). 
 
170 See, e.g., In re Aspen Way Enterprises, Inc., Complaint, File No. 1123151 (Sept. 25, 
2012). 
 
171  See, e.g., In re HTC America, Inc., Complaint, File No. 122 3049 (Feb. 22, 2013); In re 
Microsoft Corp., Complaint, File No. 0123240 (Aug. 8, 2002). 
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3. Retention: Durational Specificity 
The harm of wrongful data retention may also be resolved, in part, 
by an adequate notice.  Such a notice would provide durational 
specificity for the period of data retention.  Notices can approach the 
issue of data retention by asserting a right to retain data indefinitely, 
by establishing a time limit on data retention, or by remaining silent.  
Both asserting a right to indefinite retention and remaining silent may 
still, however, create a perceived harm from wrongful retention.  For 
example, there were six FTC complaints alleging improper retention 
and in two of these cases, the FTC pursued the companies for storing 
data indefinitely.172 In three complaints, the FTC alleged that 
companies had kept information for which there was no longer a 
“business need.”173  In one complaint, the defendant, a card payment 
processor, had kept financial information for up to 30 days.174  The 
FTC prosecuted these retention practices because the FTC believed 
that the practices created unnecessary risks to consumer information 
by increasing the likelihood of misuse or of exposure during a data 
breach.175  A proper notice would alert consumers to these risks so that 
they could make informed decisions about the duration of their 
information’s exposure.  Nevertheless, outer boundaries can still exist 
that would contradict a website’s privacy notice. 
A. Areas where Notice and Choice Cannot Satisfy User Autonomy 
While the notice and choice framework may be effective to protect 
against privacy harms in some areas, the framework will inherently be 
unable to protect against some of the articulated harms.  Breaches of 
commitments made in notices will violate the terms of user consent 
and create unauthorized disclosures, the inadequacy of data security 
cannot be cured by notice, and mismatches for data retention preclude 
the capability for notice to avoid the privacy harms.  This section will 
address these areas in which notice and choice is ineffective.  
 
 
 
 
172  See Complaint, In re Ceridian Corp., File No. 1023160 (June 15, 2011); Complaint, In re 
Life is good, Inc., File No. 0723046 (Jan. 17, 2008). 
 
173  See Complaint, In re CBR Systems, Inc., File No. 1123120 (May 3, 2013); Complaint, In 
re BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., File No. 0423160 (June 16, 2005); Complaint, In re DSW 
Inc., File No. 0523096 (Dec. 1, 2005). 
 
174  See Complaint, In re CardSystems Solutions, Inc., File No. 0523148 (Feb. 23, 2006). 
 
175  Id. 
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1. Unauthorized Disclosure:  Breaches 
Notice and choice cannot resolve any failure of a website to adhere 
to the terms of the notice.  As evidenced in the class action litigation 
and FTC enforcement cases, website privacy policies are seen as 
contracts.176  Many cases thus arise amidst broken promises to refrain 
from certain types of disclosure, as in National Research Center for 
College and University Admissions,177 Eli Lilly178 and 
Toysmart.com.179  Notice and choice cannot resolve the problem of 
broken privacy promises.  In those cases, the individual providing 
personal information does so under the promised conditions and only 
under those conditions.  Uses straying beyond the purposes disclosed 
in the notice are, by definition, unauthorized.   
2. Security: Technical Adequacy of Security Measures 
Notice and choice is also ineffective in addressing the data security 
harms.  Notice itself does not keep personal information technically 
secure.  Moreover, notwithstanding notice disclosures, the litigation 
indicates that there are certain baseline standards for security that 
cannot be waived or disclaimed.180 In other words, notice and choice 
cannot negate negligent security practices.  While a website may 
promise to keep users’ personal information secure, it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to specify the methods with which the website will 
secure information.  At most, the website can state that it will comply 
with industry standards or take “reasonable measures” to keep the 
information secure.  These disclosures, however, will not prevent data 
breaches from occurring.  The suits brought against companies for 
failure to secure personally identifiable information do not focus on 
 
 
 
 
176  See supra notes 97–102 and accompanying text. 
 
177  See Complaint, In re Nat’l Research Ctr. for Coll. & Univ. Admissions, Inc., File No. 
0223005 (Oct. 2, 2002). 
 
178  See Complaint, In re Eli Lilly & Co., File No. 012 3214 (Jan. 18, 2002). 
 
179  See Complaint, FTC v. Toysmart.com, LLC, File No. X000075, Case No. 00-11341-RGS, 
¶¶9–11 (D. Mass. July 10, 2000).  Although the FTC may bring suit for practices that are 
unfair, in most cases, the FTC alleges both deception and unfairness in their complaints.  
For cases where the alleged conduct is based on unfairness, however, it may not be 
necessary to even have a privacy policy because the allegation refers to the practice, rather 
than the notice regarding the practice.  This issue is discussed infra Part IV. 
 
180  See Breaux & Baumer, supra note 128 (showing 39 security requirements to address 
the legal security vulnerabilities). 
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whether there was notice about the security methods or that the 
company exceeded the scope of consent.181  In essence, notice was 
irrelevant to the harm.  The issue in these cases is that a third party 
was able to access information that was not, in fact, kept reasonably 
secure by the party entrusted with the information.182  Thus, a notice 
and consent framework cannot be used to address problems with data 
security. 
3. Retention: Mismatch Between Stated Duration and Business Need 
Finally, notice and choice cannot be effective to address the harms 
associated with the wrongful retention of personally identifiable 
information. Wrongful retention arises through mismatches between 
company practices and external metrics for storage duration. 
The litigation indicates that the public expects data retention 
periods to be limited to the period that is reasonably required by a 
company’s business need.  Notice may define the business need, but 
cannot unilaterally define what the public would see as a “reasonably 
required” period of retention for that business need. For example, in 
some of the lawsuits companies specified in their notices that they 
would retain customer information even after the user terminated the 
relationship or removed some personal information.183 These notices 
did not exonerate the public expectation for shorter storage terms, 
and users perceived the practice as a clear harm. In essence, user 
consent may not authorize unreasonable storage durations.  
Companies also have an incentive to keep flexibility in the 
duration of storage and draft broad privacy policies. To minimize 
litigation risk, these policies may be nonspecific or permissive on the 
issue of storage duration.  The vagueness will not, however, protect 
against wrongful retention claims.  On the opposite end, companies 
 
 
 
 
181  First Amended Complaint, In re LinkedIn User Privacy Litigation, No. 03088 (N.D. Cal. 
Nov. 26, 2011).  At the time of suit, LinkedIn’s Privacy policy stated that “[a]ll information 
that [users] provide [to LinkedIn] will be protected with industry standard protocols and 
technology.”  Id. at 2.  The allegation in the suit was that LinkedIn was negligent and failed 
to follow industry standards—not that it did not provide sufficient notice or that there was 
an issue about user consent.  Id.  
 
182  See supra Parts III.B.3 and IV.C. 
  
183  See Amazon.com Privacy Notice, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/ gp/ 
help/customer/ display.html?nodeId= 468496 (last updated Mar. 3, 2014) (“You can add 
or update certain information on pages such as those referenced in the ‘Which Information 
Can I Access?’ section. When you update information, we usually keep a copy of the prior 
version for our records.”). 
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have various recordkeeping and reporting obligations and may need 
to retain different pieces of customer information for varying periods 
of time.  Specific disclosure in this instance may be difficult and cause 
the privacy policy to become cumbersome, long, and even more 
difficult to understand.184   
Because companies generally do not, and may not be able to, 
provide notice to consumers about how long their personal 
information will be retained, and objective duration standards exist 
which cannot be disclaimed, the notice and consent framework in 
these areas are likewise outside of the “zone of effectiveness.” 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This empirical analysis has important policy ramifications.  This is 
the first comprehensive articulation of privacy harms as perceived by 
litigants in federal cases.  As such, the Article provides a typology of 
the most important privacy issues for consumers from the perspective 
of events that motivate consumers and regulators to sue.  
Significantly, this Article shows that harm is frequently not perceived 
by the public as an economic loss and provides empirical evidence for 
courts to recognize the four categories—unauthorized disclosure, 
surreptitious collection, inadequate security and wrongful retention—
as litigable harms.  
With respect to the efficacy of notice and choice, the empirical 
evidence shows that the framework can, in theory, work to prevent 
unauthorized disclosures and surreptitious collection, but that the 
framework fails to cover the harms of inadequate security and 
wrongful retention.  Even where notice and choice might work, 
boundary lines can still exist and harm can occur despite the provision 
of notice because society may still deem a particular practice as 
unacceptable.185 
Lastly, for the harms within the zone where notice and choice can 
work, the implementation of notice and choice will need to be more 
 
 
 
 
184  There is, of course, some middle ground.  For example, the policy could state that 
personal information will be retained to the extent required by law.  Such a statement, 
however, would still fail to put the user on notice of what information is being kept.  There 
would be no way for a customer to ensure that the data collector will retain only legally 
required information and not any other. 
 
185  For example, Solove and Hartzog’s analysis of FTC cases catalogs unfair practices.  See 
Solove & Hartzog, supra note 45. Similarly, notice would not immunize an online credit 
grantor that gathers personal information banned from consideration in the granting of 
credit (i.e. marital status and race).  
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effective, as the critiques of the existing mechanisms are quite 
compelling.186  Proposals such as Ryan Calo’s alternative notice and 
choice delivery vehicles appear very promising.187  Similarly, Jonathan 
Mayer and Arvind Narayanan’s work on privacy substitutes will be 
helpful to determine where technologies can assist in development.188 
 
 
 
 
 
186  See supra Part II.A.2. 
 
187  See Calo, supra note 10.  
 
188  See Jonathan Mayer & Arvind Narayanan, Privacy Substitutes, 66 STAN. L. REV. 
ONLINE 89 (2013). 
